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Monitoring and Manipulating

Brain Function
New Neuroscience Technologies and Their Ethical Implications
b y M A RT H A J . FA R A H

AND

PAUL ROOT WOLPE

The eye may be window to the soul, but neuroscientists aim to get inside and measure the interior
directly. There’s also talk about moving some walls.

C

ongress christened the 1990s “the decade of
the brain,” and this was apt from the vantage
point of the early 21st Century. Great strides
were made in both basic and clinical neuroscience.
What the current decade may, in retrospect, be remembered for is the growth of neuroscience beyond
those two categories, “basic” and “clinical,” into a
host of new applications. From the measurement of
mental processes with functional neuroimaging to
their manipulation with ever more selective drugs,
the new capabilities of neuroscience raise unprecedented ethical and social issues. These issues must be
identified and addressed if society is to benefit from
the neuroscience revolution now in progress.
Like the field of genetics, cognitive neuroscience
raises questions about the biological foundations of
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who we are. Indeed, the relation of self and personal
identity to the brain is, if anything, more direct than
that of self to the genome. In addition, the ethical
questions of neuroscience are more urgent, as neural
interventions are currently more easily accomplished
than genetic interventions. Yet compared to the field
of molecular genetics, in which ethical issues have
been at the forefront since the days of the 1975
Asilomar meeting on recombinant DNA, relatively
little attention has been paid to the ethics of neuroscience.
This situation is changing, as bioethicists and
neuroscientists are beginning to explore the emerging
social and ethical issues raised by progress in neuroscience. In the Society for Neuroscience’s recently
formulated mission statement, bioethical issues figure prominently.1 Numerous articles, meetings, and
symposia have appeared on the subject.2 The term
“neuroethics,” which originally referred to bioethical
issues in clinical neurology, has now been adopted to
refer to ethical issues in the technological advances of
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
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neuroscience more generally.3 (Unfortunately, the term is also used to refer
to the neural bases of ethical thinking,
a different topic.4))
Neuroethics encompasses a broad
and varied set of bioethical issues.
Some are similar to those that have
arisen previously in biomedicine,
such as the safety of new research and
treatment methods, the rationing of
promising new therapies, and predictive testing for future illnesses when
no cure is available (as with
Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s disease).
Other neuroethical issues, however,
are unique to neuroscience because of
the particular subject matter of that
field. The brain is the organ of the
mind and consciousness, the locus of
our sense of selfhood. Interventions
in the brain therefore have different
ethical implications than interventions in other organs. In addition, our
growing knowledge of mind-brain relations is likely to affect our definitions of competence, mental health
and illness, and death. Our moral and
legal conceptions of responsibility are
likewise susceptible to change as our
understanding of the physical mechanisms of behavior evolves. Our sense
of the privacy and confidentiality of
our own thought processes may also
be threatened by technologies that
can reveal the neural correlates of our
innermost thoughts.
Many of the new social and ethical
issues in neuroscience result from one
of two developments. The first is the
ability to monitor brain function in
living humans with a spatial and temporal resolution sufficient to capture
psychologically meaningful fluctuations of activity. The second is the
ability to alter the brain with chemical or anatomical selectivity that is
sufficient to induce specific functional changes. For each of these developments, we will review advances in the
enabling technology and provide examples of ethically challenging uses of
the technology and an analysis of the
ethical issues they raise.
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Brain Scan Fan, by Christine Pendergrass, clay on wood, 11” x 20” x 2”
Neuroimaging

T

he history of modern brain imaging began in the 1970s with
computed axial tomography or CAT
scans and proceeded at a rapid and
accelerating rate for the remaining
decades of the twentieth century. The
idea of passing X-rays through the
head from multiple directions and reconstructing a three-dimensional
structural image, revolutionary at the
time, was quickly adapted to radiological signals other than X-rays.
These included radiation from exogenous tracers to enable imaging of
brain function, as in positron emission tomography (PET) and single
photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and endogenously
generated magnetic fields to image either structure or function, as in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Pioneering research on cognition and
emotion was undertaken with PET
and SPECT in the 1980s, and by the
1990s MRI, the noninvasive alternative to PET, became commonplace in
research.5
In an MRI, atoms are first aligned
by a strong static magnetic field, then
knocked out of alignment by a radio
frequency pulse, and then allowed to
realign. The fluctuating field created
as the atoms “relax” to the aligned

state is the signal that is measured. Although early functional MRI used an
injected contrast agent, current methods use the magnetic properties of the
blood itself as a tracer, and are therefore entirely noninvasive. In blood
oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
MRI, the different magnetic susceptibility of oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin provides a measure of
regional brain activity.6 In arterial
spin labeling (ASL) MRI, the atoms
are aligned by a magnetic field at the
neck, and relax as they circulate
through the brain, indicating regional
perfusion.7 The spatial and temporal
resolution of functional MRI (fMRI)
is limited by haemodynamics rather
than by the physics of the method;
blood flow changes over seconds in
response to neural activity, and these
changes extend into nearby tissue. In
practice, fMRI has a spatial resolution
of one millimeter and a temporal resolution of about one second, which is
adequate to distinguish among at
least some psychologically meaningful differences in brain activity.8 A few
additional methods figure in the cognitive neuroimaging revolution. One
is structural MRI, from which precise
measurements of brain size and shape
can be made. Combined with reliable
methods for delineating and measuring particular brain structures, this
May- June 2004

has opened up the field of brain morphometry, in which slight anatomical
variations are correlated with psychological traits.9 The venerable techniques of electroencephalography
(EEG) and event-related potentials
(ERP) have acquired new capabilities
by the application of signal processing techniques that allow better localization of brain activity and analysis
of temporal patterns of activity.10 Optical methods, such as near infrared
spectroscopy (NIRS), provide another noninvasive measure of regional
brain activity based on the absorption
of different wavelengths of light as it
passes through the head.11
By and large, these methods have
been developed for long-standing
clinical and scientific goals, from localizing seizure foci to studying the
neurochemical abnormalities in psychiatric illness. These uses are associated with ethical issues of a familiar
nature: for example, the risks of radiation, obtaining adequate informed

draw his vice presidential candidacy
after his history of depression became
known. Nevertheless, psychiatric illness continues to carry a stigma, and
a currently healthy individual might
well wish to avoid disclosing a psychiatric history. The finding that depression, schizophrenia, and other illnesses leave their marks on the brain raises the possibility that psychiatric history and risk could be inferred from a
brain scan without an individual’s
knowledge or consent. For the most
part, the currently available markers
are morphometric, relying on structural rather than functional imaging.12
Although the abnormalities that
characterize particular illnesses can be
demonstrated when small groups of
patients are compared to control subjects, they are not currently diagnostic at the individual patient level.
Nevertheless, diagnostic imaging is
currently the goal of many research
groups, with encouraging results for

healthy subjects, not selected for
being especially extreme on any dimension, and they performed correlations between personality scale
scores and brain activation in regions
of a priori interest throughout the
brain. Despite the seemingly low
power of such designs, a number of
positive results have been reported,
with both converging and diverging
results among the studies. The areas
that distinguish normal people with
differing personality at rest include a
large number of cortical and subcortical areas, particularly paralimbic
cortical areas such as the insula, orbital frontal cortex, and the anterior
cingulate, as well as subcortical structures, such as the amygdala and putamen.
Canli and colleagues have sought
correlates of personality in the brain’s
response to emotionally evocative
stimuli. Given that many aspects of
personality are most apparent in the
context of frightening, happy, sad, or

In principle, and increasingly in practice, imaging can be used to
infer people’s psychological traits and states, in many cases without the
person’s cooperation or consent. It can be used, in effect, as a
crude form of mind reading.
consent (especially from the mentally
ill), and the possibility of discovering
incidental brain anomalies. However,
neuroimaging also yields information
that can be used for different purposes, raising new ethical issues. In principle, and increasingly in practice,
imaging can be used to infer people’s
psychological traits and states, in
many cases without the person’s cooperation or consent. It can be used,
in effect, as a crude form of mind
reading.
Imaging of Personal
Information

O

ur society’s attitude toward
mental illness has come a long
way since 1972, when Senator
Thomas Eagleton was forced to with-
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some disorders, for example
ADHD.13 Should diagnostic imaging
become reliable, the possibility of inferring current or prior psychiatric illness from images taken for other purposes will also become a concern.
Imaging of personality

A

number of recent studies have
sought neuroimaging correlates
of personality found in classic theories of normal personality, including
extraversion/ introversion, neuroticism, novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward dependence.14 Most
of the studies employed resting scans
(that is, scans that were obtained
while subjects were simply resting,
rather than performing any particular
task) of groups of twelve to thirty

tempting stimuli, such an approach
has the potential to identify important differences not apparent in resting scans. In one study, Canli focused on two personality traits: extraversion, which is the tendency to seek
out and enjoy social contact and
maintain an upbeat outlook, and
neuroticism, which is the tendency to
worry and focus on negative information.15 They found that extraversion
was correlated with brain response in
several areas to pictures with positive
emotional valence such as puppies,
ice cream, and sunsets. The effect was
specific to positive and not negative
stimuli, and this was confirmed in a
later study with pictures of happy and
fearful faces.16 Neuroticism, in contrast, is associated with differences in
response to negative but not positive
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

37

stimuli. Photographs of spiders,
cemeteries, crying people, and other
negatively valenced images evoked
more response in certain brain areas
the more neurotic the subject. Positive pictures did not show such an effect.
Imaging of Social and Moral
Attitudes

I

n a now well-known study, Phelps
and colleagues studied white subjects’ attitudes toward unfamiliar
black faces, using both behavioral
measures and fMRI.17 Using previously developed behavioral measures,
they were able to estimate the degree
of unconscious negative evaluation of
unfamiliar black as opposed to white
faces. They then measured brain response to unfamiliar black and white
faces and found a moderately strong
correlation between individuals’
amygdala activation and the degree of
negative evaluation of black faces.
Racial group identity also has
neural correlates that are roughly
measurable with current brain imaging methods. In a study of black and
white subjects viewing photographs
of black and white faces, significant
differences in response to in-group
and out-group faces were found.18
Differences in the way people view
particular actions as right or wrong,
across specific moral dilemmas and
across individuals, have measurable
neural correlates. In particular,
Greene and colleagues used fMRI to
demonstrate different patterns of
brain activation associated with the
logical weighing of rights and
wrongs. For example, they found that
the emotional centers of the brain
were more active when subjects made
moral decisions based more on their
visceral reactions than on a rational
weighing of costs and benefits.19
Imaging of Preferences

T

he objects of a person’s desires
may also be discernable in some
cases with functional neuroimaging.
The first experiments to demonstrate
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this concerned drug craving. Drugfree cocaine addicts experience a craving state when shown pictures of
drug paraphernalia, which results in
reliable group differences in PET activation of limbic and paralimbic
areas, including the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, and orbitofrontal
cortex.20
Drug use is not unique in this respect; other stimuli to which individuals are strongly attracted have been
found to evoke activity in these neural circuits. Subjects aroused by sexually explicit videos activate many of the
same limbic system areas as drug
craving does.21 Furthermore, the conscious attempt to suppress arousal
may also engender a distinct pattern
of brain activation.22 For this reason
neuroimaging may be more informative than peripheral measures that are
capable of revealing sexual preferences.
Objects that are feared or disliked
may also be discerned by brain imaging. Amygdala responses to photographs of upsetting scenes and unpleasant facial expressions are among
the most reliable findings in the
imaging literature on emotion.23 Indeed, the amygdala response to such
stimuli is detectable even when the
photographs have been presented at
subliminal exposure durations and
subjects are not aware of having seen
them.24
Forensic Imaging

T

he ability to know a person’s attitudes and thoughts and to predict their actions would be particularly useful within the criminal justice,
intelligence, and immigration enforcement communities, where interviewees are often motivated to lie or
to withhold desired information. Several different applications of functional neuroimaging are being explored with support from these communities.
Lie detection is one of the most
sought-after applications. The work
of Langleblen and colleagues attracted tremendous media attention when

it showed differences in subjects’
brain activation when bluffing versus
telling the truth about symbols on
playing cards.25 Lee et al. mapped the
differences in brain activation in a
memory task between honest test
performance and simulated malingering.26 Such research has a long way to
go before it can be used to detect
spontaneous, genuine deception. The
forms of deception being detected in
these studies involve highly constrained questions and may reflect
nothing more than the additional
cognitive effort required to deceive.
The “guilty knowledge test,” used
for decades with peripheral measures
of autonomic response, has been
adapted for use with scalp-recorded
event-related potentials (ERPs) and
marketed by ERP researcher
Lawrence Farwell. The method is
based on the difference in the P300
ERP evoked by familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. In Farwell’s “brain fingerprinting,” people, objects, or scenes
associated with a crime are presented
to an individual to determine
whether the brain recognizes the
image as familiar (such as whether a
crime scene appears “familiar” to the
brain despite the subjects claim he
has never been there). The Brain Fingerprinting company’s web site describes the method as “a new paradigm in criminal investigations and
counterterrorism,”27 and indeed it
has been admitted as evidence in
court28 and is being promoted as a
means of screening for terrorists, despite the reservations of leading ERP
researchers such as Emmanual
Donchin.29
In addition to the problem of discriminating intentional lies from
truth, brain imaging is potentially applicable to a related problem of great
legal significance: the problem of discriminating false memory from
veridical memory. A false memory is
a kind of memory error that occurs
when a person mistakenly believes
that he or she remembers an event
that did not actually take place.
When false memories are induced in
the laboratory, they evoke patterns of
May- June 2004

activity in memory-related areas of
the brain that are distinctive from
both veridical memories and correct
judgments that an event did not happen. Whereas both veridical and false
memories activate the hippocampus,
the parahippocampal region is activated more strongly by veridical
memories.30
Finally, the effort to predict future
violent crime may eventually be aided
by functional neuroimaging. Some
offenders commit one violent crime
and live the rest of their lives without
harming anyone, whereas others continue to be violent. Personality factors
correlate to some degree with these
tendencies, but more recently PET
and fMRI have been used on an experimental basis to distinguish these
two populations.31
Imaging Specific Thoughts

P

erhaps the most science-fictionesque example of brain imaging as mind reading comes from

Kanwisher accomplished a similar
feat with subjects’ purely mental images, formed from memory in the absence of a visual stimulus.32 After first
showing subjects pictures of faces and
houses and noting the locations of
maximum activation to each type of
stimulus, they instructed the same
subjects to imagine faces and houses.
For a majority of the scans, the researchers were able to tell whether a
subject was thinking about a face and
a house just by explaining the scan.
Ethical Issues in Neuroimaging

T

he main ethical problem that the
scientific trends just reviewed
pose concerns privacy. As with any
testing method that reveals new kinds
of information about an individual
(genetic testing for breast cancer risk,
for example), it may not always be in
the individual’s best interest to have
that information available to others.
There is an added dimension of ethical significance when the information

lated private information to whatever
party evaluates (or subpoenas) the
image. The experimental paradigm
used by Phelps and colleagues to correlate amygdala activation with racial
attitudes simply required subjects to
view pictures of faces, and it could be
administered in the guise of a face
perception study. Brain activation can
reveal attitudes and feelings that the
subject may not be aware of having.
For example, although subjects in
Whalen’s study were not aware of
having seen fearful facial expressions
when the expressions were presented
subliminally, and cortical brain regions did not react to them, the
amygdala nevertheless responded.
What obstacles lay between the
present state of imaging technology
and the ability reliably to read personality, psychiatric history, truthfulness and so on from an individual’s
brain scan? One important limitation
of the current technology is the need
to aggregate data over multiple observations. When the individual subject

It may eventually be possible for employers, juries, parole boards, or law
enforcement to examine your brain in order to answer: Are you prone to
depression? How neurotic are you? To whom are you sexually attracted? How do
you feel about other races? What scares you? Have you abused illegal drugs?
studies of high-level vision. Although
visual processing does not have the
obvious personal and social relevance
that we associate with social attitudes,
emotions, or tendencies to violence,
the striking thing about work in this
area is the specificity of the mental
content that can be recovered by analyzing a brain image. Haxby and colleagues scanned subjects while they
viewed numerous pictures each of
faces, cats, houses, chairs, scissors,
shoes, and bottles.32 They found that
the overall pattern of activation in the
ventral extrastriate cortex enabled
them to classify the stimulus category
been viewed by the subject with 96
percent accuracy.
Working with a reduced set of
stimulus categories, O’Craven and
May- June 2004

concerns the kinds of personal traits
and states that neuroimaging may reveal. The current technology can, in
some cases, breach the privacy of a
person’s own mind, for example laying bare a disavowed attitude toward
particular races. It may eventually be
possible for employers, juries, parole
boards, or law enforcement to examine your brain in order to answer: Are
you prone to depression? How neurotic are you? To whom are you sexually attracted? How do you feel about
other races? What scares you? Have
you abused illegal drugs?
An individual need not know
when images are used to obtain personal information. Images used for
one purpose, for example medical diagnosis, may nevertheless reveal unre-

is the unit of analysis, the need for
multiple trials of data collection may
be impractical. Although fears or
cravings can be evoked repeatedly if
necessary, the recall of a specific
memory cannot be repeated without
changing the nature of the memory
itself. For most of the examples cited
here, subject groups must be compared in order to obtain reliable differences between groups (between
formerly depressed and never-depressed individuals, for example), or
to detect a relation to a trait (such as
extraversion).
Nevertheless, even a scanning protocol that is incapable of reliably classifying all individuals may be able to
classify individuals with relatively extreme patterns of brain activity, and
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
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so may be seen as a useful screening
tool in certain circumstances. In one
lab, for example, at least half of recently detoxified cocaine users could
be identified by differential amygdala
response to drug-related versus nondrug-related pictures.34 In another,
simple visual examination of whole
brain activity patterns allowed at least
a fraction of the subjects to be sorted
by personality trait.35 Even when patterns of brain activation are not extreme, they provide information sufficient to narrow the range of an individual’s likely values on psychological
traits of interest. Using only the published data in reports of imaging correlates of personality traits, a new individual’s trait level could be bracket-

ports, one commentator wrote, “Although people lie . . . brainwaves do
not.”37
Although brainwaves do not lie,
neither do they tell the truth; they are
simply measures of brain activity.
Whether based on regional cerebral
bloodflow or electrical activity, brain
images must be interpreted like any
other correlate of mental activity, behavioral or physiological. Brain images and waveforms give an impression of concreteness and directness
compared to behavioral measures of
psychological traits and states, and
high-tech instrumentation lends an
aura of accuracy and objectivity. Nevertheless, the psychological interpretations of these measures are far from

migration service, and so on will use
these technologies prematurely.
Brain Enhancement

T

he psychopharmacology of the
mid-twentieth century depended
entirely on serendipity. The antihistamine chlorpromazine was accidentally found to calm agitated schizophrenic patients and reduce their psychosis. Another early drug investigated for its antipsychotic properties,
imipramine, turned out to be ineffective for that purpose, but was observed to lift the mood of some of the
patients taking it. When a small
number of patients with major depression tried it, the therapeutic effect

The military’s substantial support for brain-machine interfaces
suggests that some think normal healthy individuals
might someday be enhanced by neural prostheses.

ed within a range of 2.0 to 3.5 standard deviations (depending on the
study), compared to the 4.0 standard
deviation range of the population.36
Illusory Accuracy

I

n addition to privacy concerns,
neuroimaging is liable to over-reliance on, or misapplication of, information from brain scans. The ability
to assess personality, attitudes, and
desires would be of interest in screening for employment, school tracking,
or military service. The ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, or veridical and false memory,
would find wide use in the legal system. The demand for these abilities,
coupled with the inevitable misunderstandings of brain imaging among
the lay public, sets the stage for misuse. Physiological measures, especially
brain-based measures, possess an illusory accuracy and objectivity as perceived by the general public. In
proposing the use of brain fingerprinting as a screening tool at air-
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direct or intrinsically objective. As the
foregoing review suggests, progress
has been made in the use of such
measures, and some inferences to socially relevant traits and states can
now be made with a degree of certainty under specific and highly controlled conditions. However, the current state of the art does not allow reliable screening, profiling, or lie detection.
There is no reason to doubt that
the state of the art will improve in the
coming years. Brain-based measures
do, in principle, have an advantage as
indices of psychological traits and
states over more familiar behavioral
or autonomic measures. They are one
causal step closer to these traits and
states than responses on personality
questionnaires or polygraph tracings.
Imaging may therefore one day provide the most sensitive and specific
measures available of psychological
processes. For now, however, this is
not the case, and there is a risk that
juries, judges, parole boards, the im-

was dramatic, and imipramine continues to be used as an antidepressant
today. The second antidepressant to
be discovered, iproniazid, was hitherto used as an antibiotic for treating
patients with tuberculosis when its
mood-elevating properties were observed. Similar accidental discoveries
led to the identification of amphetamine as a stimulant in the course of
refining a treatment for asthma, and
meprobamate as an anti-anxiety treatment in the course of testing an antibiotic.38
Such lucky accidents were then
augmented by trial and error tests
with other molecules of similar structure. Parallel to this development, researchers began to understand the effects of these drugs on brain function,
identifying the specific neurotransmitter systems affected by the drugs
and the mechanisms by which the
drugs interacted with these systems.
The advent of direct-binding assays
in the 1960s provided the first direct
approach to testing and comparing
the affinity of a drug for different
May- June 2004

neurotransmitter receptors, and the
tools of the molecular biology revolution, including the cloning of rare
subtypes of receptors, allowed for the
design of highly selective agonists, antagonists, and other molecules to influence selectively the process of neurotransmission.
The continual improvement in
side-effect profile of modern psychotropic medications is due to the
increasing selectivity of drug action
made possible by the methods of
molecular neuroscience. “Selective” is
the first S in SSRI, the class of drugs
to which fluoxetine (Prozac) belongs.
New drugs with ever more selective
actions on the neurochemistry of
mood, anxiety, attention, and memory are under development. Although
intended for therapy, many of these
drugs affect brain function in healthy
people, raising the possibility of their
use for enhancement of normal function rather than remediation of dysfuntion.
The enhancement potential of
some medications is, in itself, nothing
new, and the attempts of human beings to use chemical substances to
alter normal affective and cognitive
traits is as old as the drinking of alcohol. Until recently, however, psychotropic drugs had significant risks
and side effects that limited their attractiveness. This situation is changing as side-effect profiles become
more tolerable. In addition, therapy
in conjunction with other drugs is an
increasingly common strategy for
counteracting the remaining side effects. For example, the most troublesome side effect for users of SSRIs is
sexual dysfunction, which responds
well to the drug sildenafil (Viagra).
Other drugs specifically developed to
counteract the sexual side effects of
SSRIs are in development and clinical
trials. The result of both new designer
drugs and adjuvant drugs is the same:
increasingly selective alteration of our
mental states and abilities through
neurochemical intervention, with
correspondingly less downside to
their use by anyone, sick or well.
May- June 2004

Technical advances in non-pharmaceutical methods for altering brain
function are also creating potential
enhancement tools. Transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and,
more rarely, vagus nerve stimulation
and deep-brain stimulation have already been used to improve mental
function or mood in patients with
medically intractable neuropsychiatric illnesses.39 Research on the effects of non-pharmaceutical methods
on brain function in normal individuals has been limited to the relatively
less invasive TMS. Mood effects on
normal healthy subjects have been investigated in the context of basic research on mood and brain function,40
and at least one laboratory is devoted
to the development of TMS methods
for enhancing normal cognition.41 Finally, there is growing research interest in computer augmentation of
brains. Most research on brain-machine interfaces currently focuses on
capturing and using movement command signals from the brain and carrying sensory inputs to the brain, for
example from a video camera.42 One
research program is tackling memory
augmentation by developing a prosthetic hippocampus that can be interfaced with a rodent brain.43 The motivation for this research is partly scientific, to better understand neural
coding of sensory, motor, and memory information, and partly clinical, to
help patients with paralysis and peripheral sensory impairments.
Nevertheless, the military’s substantial support for this research suggests that some think normal healthy
individuals might someday be enhanced by neural prostheses.44
Enhancement of Normal Mood

A

mphetamines, barbituates, benzodiazepenes, and other “mother’s little helpers” have long been used
to improve the moods of healthy people. However, the high potential for
addiction and tolerance with these
drugs dissuades most people from
using them. Pre-SSRI antidepressants, while presenting no such risks,

have unpleasant side effects that limit
their appeal only to those faced with
clinical depression as the alternative.
The SSRIs, in contrast, have relatively narrower neurochemical effects and
consequently fewer side effects. The
result, as Peter Kramer described in
Listening to Prozac, is that many people who would never have taken a tricyclic antidepressant are taking
SSRIs.45
Of course, most people using
SSRIs meet DSM IV criteria for some
psychiatric disorder, although not
necessarily major depression: dysthymia (a mild depression), social
phobia (an extreme form of shyness
and self-consciousness), premenstrual
dysphoric disorder (a recurrent negative mood associated with PMS) and
various eating disorders respond well
to SSRIs. It nevertheless remains controversial whether some of these diagnostic categories are medicalized labels for normal variants of human
personality, which do not necessarily
require pharmaceutical treatment. In
addition, some people using SSRIs
have no recognized illness. These include people who have suffered from
depression in the past and choose to
continue medication prophylactically,
as well as people who, in Peter
Kramer’s words, feel “better than
well” when taking an antidepressant.
What is the effect of SSRIs on normal, healthy individuals? While no
systematic studies have examined individuals who choose to take these
medications, a handful of studies
have assessed the effects of SSRIs on
mood and personality in randomly
selected healthy subjects over short
periods of a few months or less.46 Effects on mood are relatively selective,
reducing self-reported negative affect
while leaving positive affect neither
increased nor decreased. The drugs
also increased affiliative behavior in
laboratory social interactions and cooperative/competitive games played
with confederates. For example, subjects on the drug spoke fewer commands and instead made more suggestions. In one double-blind
crossover design, subjects were not
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
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only more cooperative in a game, but
showed real world changes in behavior as well: Flatmates found the subjects less submissive on citalopam,
though no more dominant or hostile.47 Although more research is
needed to clarify the effects of SSRIs
and other antidepressant agents on
mood and behavior of normal
healthy subjects, and long-term studies are needed on those who choose to
take SSRIs in real-life settings, the evidence so far suggests subtle but salutary effects without significant shortterm side effects.
Enhancement of Cognition

O

ur current ability to enhance
cognition through the direct alteration of brain function involves
two types of cognitive function: at-

shown to enhance attention across a
variety of different tests in healthy
young volunteers.49
Do these laboratory-measured improvements translate into a noticeable
improvement of real world cognitive
performance? No experimental evidence is available, but the growing illicit use of ADHD medications on
college campuses suggests that many
young adults believe their cognition is
enhanced by the drugs.50 Parents also
appear to find real world benefits for
their normal children with ADHD
medication: In certain school districts
the proportion of boys taking
methylphenidate exceeds the most
generous estimates of ADHD prevalence.51
Memory is the other cognitive
ability that can, at present, be manipulated to some degree by drugs. Inter-

ecular cascade that underlies memory
formation, including the initial induction of long-term potentiation
(LTP) and the later stages of memory
consolidation. There is reason to believe that some of the products under
development would work for enhancement as well as therapy. For example, treatment of healthy human
subjects with an ampakine, which enhances LTP, improved performance
in a dose-dependent manner.54
Few consider memory enhancement for the young to be a goal. Although some specialized pursuits
such as certain competitive card
games could conceivably benefit from
super-memory, evidence suggests that
the forgetting rates of normal young
humans are optimal for most purposes.55 Empirically, prodigious memory
has been linked to difficulties with

As the molecular biology of memory progresses, it presents drug designers
with a variety of entry points through which to influence the
specific processes of memory formation. A huge research effort
is now being directed to the development of memory-boosting drugs.
tention and memory. “Attention” is
used here in its broadest sense, including active use of working memory, executive function, and other
forms of cognitive self-control. These
are the cognitive abilities most obviously deficient in the syndrome of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). These same abilities
vary in their strength within the normal population. Indeed it seems likely that ADHD represents the lower
tail of the whole population distribution rather than a qualitatively different state of functioning, discontinuous with the normal population.48
Drugs targeting the neurotransmitter systems dopamine and
norephinephrine are effective in treating ADHD, and have been shown to
improve normal attentional function
as well. Methyphenidate (Ritalin) and
amphetamine (Adderal), as well as
modafinil (Provigil, a newer drug approved for regulating sleep) have been
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est in memory enhancement has so
far been confined to the middle-aged
and elderly, whose memory ability
undergoes a gradual decline even in
the absence of dementia. The most
commonly used method involves manipulation not of memory circuits per
se but of cerebrovascular function.
Herbal supplements such as Gingko
Biloba affect memory mainly by increasing blood flow within the brain.
However, the effectiveness of this
treatment is questionable.52 How
close are we to more specific and effective memory enhancement for
healthy older adults?
As the molecular biology of memory progresses, it presents drug designers with a variety of entry points
through which to influence the specific processes of memory formation.
A huge research effort is now being
directed to the development of memory-boosting drugs.53 The candidate
drugs target various stages in the mol-

thinking and problem solving,56 and
computationally, the effect of boosting the durability of individual memories is to decrease the ability to generalize.57
Indeed, in some circumstances reduced learning would confer benefit.
Memories of traumatic events can
cause lifelong suffering in the form of
post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and methods are being
sought to prevent the consolidation
of such memories by intervening
pharmacologically immediately following the trauma.58 Drugs that interfere with the consolidation of
memories in general, such as benzodiazepines, are well known.59 Extending
these methods beyond the victims of
trauma, to anyone wishing to avoid
remembering an unpleasant event, is
yet another way in which the neural
bases of memory could be altered to
enhance normal function.
May- June 2004

Ethical Issues in Enhancement

A

lthough the promise of enhancement is easy to identify—
smarter, more cheerful, and more capable people—the risk is harder to articulate. Most people feel at least
some ambivalence about neuropsychological enhancement, but distinguishing realistic or compelling arguments from generalized fear is often
difficult.
Many of the ethical issues raised by
neuropsychological enhancement also
arise with other types of enhancement.60 Cosmetic surgery and the use
of human growth hormone for
healthy children who are naturally
short, for example, are medical enhancements that do not affect brain
function, and though both are controversial, both are generally accepted.
Enhancement techniques that affect
brain function through more familiar
and non-neuroscience-based interventions such as biofeedback, meditation, tutoring, or psychotherapy are
not seen as objectionable, and, in fact,
are often seen as laudable. What,
then, are the objections to using pharmaceutical or other neurotechnological means to achieve the same ends as
behavioral techniques? Much recent
discussion has focused on this question.61 Although few if any ethical
concerns arise uniquely in connection
with neuroscience-based methods,
two concerns seem particularly salient
in the context of neural interventions
for enhancement compared with
other biomedical interventions whose
targets are not psychological, on the
one hand, and behavioral interventions for psychological enhancement,
on the other.62
The first of these concerns is safety.
Safety is a concern with all medications and procedures, but in comparison to other comparably elective
treatments such as cosmetic surgery
or growth hormone treatment, neuroscience-based enhancement involves
intervening in a far more complex
system. We are therefore at greater
risk of unanticipated problems when
we tinker. Would endowing learners
May- June 2004

with supermemory interfere with
their ability to understand what they
have learned and relate it to other
knowledge? Might today’s Ritalin
users face an old age of premature
cognitive decline? These are empirical
questions, of course, which can only
be answered in time. So far, medications such as SSRIs and stimulants
have good safety records, and their
long-term effects may even be positive. For example, SSRIs have been
shown to be neuroprotective over the
long term.63 A recent study of the effects of Ritalin on rat brain development showed both desirable and undesirable effects on later adult behavior.64 Nevertheless, drug safety testing
does not routinely address long-term
use, and relatively little evidence is
available on long-term use by healthy
subjects. It remains an open empirical
issue whether the net effects of these
or other yet-to-be developed drugs are
positive or negative.
The second concern about neuroscience-based enhancement is more
complex and difficult to state succinctly. This is actually a group of related concerns resulting from the
many ways in which neurosciencebased enhancement intersects with
our understanding of what it means
to be a person, to be healthy and
whole, to do meaningful work, and to
value human life in all its imperfection. The recent report of the President’s Council on Bioethics emphasized these issues in its discussion of
enhancement. At the heart of this
group of concerns is the problem of
reconciling our understanding of persons and brains.65
Among the widely shared intuitions about persons are the following:
Persons have a kind of value that is independent of any commodity or capability they bring to the world. Persons are responsible for their actions
and deserve blame or respect depending on those actions. Persons lead
lives that have meaning, and although
it is difficult to say exactly what is
meant by “meaning” in this context,
most of us would agree that accomplishments in life are made meaning-

ful partly by the effort they require.
Finally, persons endure over time; although some of their characteristics
may change, there is a self that remains constant for as long as the person can be said to exist.
Brains are physical systems and as
such do not share any of the foregoing
qualities. Of course, neurosciencebased enhancements work because
changes to the brain result in changes
to the person. To use such enhancements, without infringing on our personhood, can seem a contradiction, or
at least perplexing, and raises a number of concerns. Maximizing the performance capabilities of an already
healthy, functional person can be
viewed as commodifying human abilities. Improving behavior pharmacologically seems to detract from the responsibility of the person for his or
her own actions. Reducing the effort
needed for personal accomplishments
by neurochemical means may reduce
their meaning as well. And the changing of abilities, memories, and moods
at will by swallowing a pill may undermine the idea of a constant “self.”
Pending Challenges

Technologies for monitoring and
manipulating the brain have developed rapidly over the last few decades
and are poised for continued growth.
Some of the ethical problems posed
by these developments have immediate practical consequences. Examples
of such problems include the illusory
accuracy of brain images in forensic
contexts and the unknown safety of
long-term stimulant use by healthy
adults and children. Other ethical
problems are on the horizon, pending
further technological progress. For example, brain imaging will not pose a
serious threat to privacy until scanning methods can reliably deliver useful information about individual subjects. Although this is not the case at
present, the development is foreseeable and could have enormous practical consequences.
Another way in which developments in neuroscience will influence
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
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society is less tangible than those just
mentioned, but no less consequential.
Both brain imaging and brain-based
enhancement are forcing us to confront the fact that we are physical systems. If specific abilities, personality
traits, and dispositions are manifest in
characteristic patterns of brain activation and can be manipulated by specific neurochemical interventions,
then they must be part of the physical
world. Our intuitions about personhood do not mesh easily with this realization. At the very least, the realization calls for a considerably more nuanced idea of personal responsibility
in law and morality.65 More generally,
it will prove challenging to traditional
ideas regarding the soul, or the nonmaterial component of the human
mind.
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